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TRANSPLANTING CHAPTER 11 OF THE US BANKRUPTCY CODE INTO SINGAPORE’S 
RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY LAWS: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 
 
 
Abstract 
In 2017, Singapore introduced wide-ranging reforms to its insolvency and restructuring laws 
with a view to enhancing its attractiveness as an international centre for debt restructuring. 
Central to these reforms is the transplantation (with modification) of certain provisions from 
Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code including the automatic moratorium, cross-creditor 
cram-down, rescue financing and pre-packs. Drawing upon the US experience and similar reform 
proposals in the EU (including the UK), we critically evaluate the impact of the new Singapore 
law. We argue that there remain challenges in ensuring that the transplantation works well and 
highlight the possible unintended consequences of such transplantation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A good restructuring and insolvency legal regime is vital to the broader economy in promoting the 
restructuring of viable businesses and efficient closure and transfer of assets of failed businesses. 
With the rise of demand for corporate restructuring services worldwide, there are strong incentives 
among countries, particularly those with international financial centres, continually to review and 
modernise their restructuring and insolvency laws.1 The importance of an effective legal and 
regulatory framework for a debt restructuring regime is underscored by a recent survey by 
Debtwire which has identified the greatest impediment towards a successful restructuring effort as 
being unfavourable bankruptcy laws.2  
To this end, the European Commission3 has recently reviewed the restructuring and 
insolvency framework and proposed significant changes, though none of these proposed reforms 
have been enacted into law yet. The United Kingdom (UK) Insolvency Service has also conducted 
a similar exercise in relation to the UK specifically though again there have been no legislative 
changes.4 The central theme of all the proposed reforms relate to the adaptation (and adoption) of 
various provisions of Chapter 11 of the United States (US) Bankruptcy Code 1978 (Bankruptcy 
Code), which are widely regarded as pro-debtor,5 pro-restructuring6 and highly flexible. Chapter 
11 has been held out as a success and as a model for the reform of restructuring laws worldwide.7 
Some Chapter 11 proponents suggest that its provisions merit a prominent place in ‘the pantheon 
of extraordinary laws that have shaped the American economy and society and then echoed 
                                               
 
1 On the role of law generally and institutions in promoting economic development see generally D North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance: The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions 
(Cambridge University Press 1990); C Goodhart, ‘Economics and the Law: Too Much One-Way Traffic?’ (1997) 60 
MLR 1; R Posner, ‘Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development’ (1998) 13 World Bank Research 
Observer 1; K Dam, The Law-Growth Nexus: The Rule of Law in Economic Development (Brookings Institution 
Press 2013). 
2  DebtWire, ‘Asia-Pacific Distressed Debt & Special Situations Update’ (PwC, November 2016) 
<https://www.pwc.com/sg/en/publications/distressed-debt-special-situation-mkt-2016.html>. 
3  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, 
insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU COM (2016) 0723 final. 
4  The Insolvency Service, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A Consultation on Options for 
Reform (May 2016). 
5  See T Eisenberg and S Sundgren, ‘Is Chapter 11 Too Favorable to Debtors? Evidence from Abroad’, 
(1997) 82 Cornell L Rev 1532; cf G McCormack, ‘Control and Cooperative Rescue – An Anglo-American 
Evaluation’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 515 (describing the characterisation as somewhat simplistic); G McCormack, 
‘Corporate Rescue Law in Singapore and the Appropriateness of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code’ (2008) 20 
SAcLJ 396. 
6  See S Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 36 OJLS 
297. 
7  In a leading study by inter alia, the Association of Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) and Frontier 
Economics it has been described as an important comparison point for further insolvency law reform in Europe: 
AFME, Frontier Economics and Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, Potential economic gains from reforming 
insolvency law in Europe (AFME, February 2016), 12 
<https://www.afme.eu/globalassets/downloads/publications/afme-insolvency-reform-report-2016-english.pdf>; see 
generally M Brouwer, ‘Reorganization in US and European Bankruptcy Law’ (2006) 22 European Journal of Law 
and Economics 5. 
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throughout the world’.8 According to one leading case, Chapter 11 has as its objective ‘to provide 
a debtor with the legal protection necessary to give it the opportunity to reorganize, and thereby to 
provide creditors with going-concern value rather than the possibility of a more meagre satisfaction 
of outstanding debts through liquidation’.9 To this end, Chapter 11 contains certain fundamental 
characteristics such as a ‘strong’ automatic stay of creditor actions to the debtor company, a debtor 
in possession regime where the management remains in control of the debtor company and 
continues to lead its restructuring efforts, the availability of super-priority financing and a cross-
creditor cram-down process. 
In line with international developments, Singapore has recently reviewed and adopted 
wide-ranging reforms to its insolvency restructuring regime in 2017. These 2017 reforms draw on 
the recommendations made by Singapore’s Insolvency Law Review Committee (ILRC) in its 
report in 2013 (2013 Report),10 but more directly on the subsequent report of the Committee to 
Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring (Restructuring Committee) 
in 2016 (2016 Report).11 The 2017 reforms, implemented via Companies (Amendment) Act 2017, 
comprise the engrafting of certain Chapter 11 features into the local scheme of arrangement 
procedure, which is an important debt restructuring tool, and the adoption of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency.12 A further set of reforms is expected to take place in 
2018, to take into account the remaining recommendations of the ILRC. This article focuses on 
the 2017 reforms and, in particular, the inclusion of Chapter 11 provisions in Singapore law. In 
this article, we refer to the amendments effected pursuant to the Companies (Amendment) Act of 
201713 as the ‘2017 reforms’. 
In this article, we seek to answer the following questions: whether the transplant of Chapter 
11 provisions (with modifications) is likely to work well in Singapore and what are some of the 
challenges that may be encountered in connection with this transplant.14 It is something of a truism 
that reform must be sensitive to local conditions and should take account of different implementing 
                                               
8  See E Warren and JL Westbrook, ‘The Success of Chapter 11: A Challenge to the Critics’ (2009) 107 
Michigan Law Review 603, 604. 
9  Canadian Pacific Forest Products Ltd v JD Irving Ltd (1995) 66 F 3d 1436, 1442. 
10  Insolvency Law Review Committee, Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee: Final Report 
(Ministry of Law, 2013) 
<https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Revised%20Report%20of%20the%20Insolvency%20L
aw%20Review%20Committee.pdf> (2013 Report). 
11  Committee to Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring, Report of the 
Committee (Ministry of Law, 2016) 
<https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Report%20of%20the%20Committee.pdf> (2016 
Report). 
12  See UNCITRAL, ‘UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997)’ 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html>; for a somewhat sceptical and 
partly Singaporean perspective on the Model Law of Cross Border Insolvency, see C Mohan ‘Cross-border 
Insolvency Problems: Is the UNCITRAL Model Law the Answer?’ (2012) 21 International Insolvency Review 199.  
13  The Companies (Amendment) Act 2017 introduces, among others, the new sections 211A to 211J of the 
Companies Act (Cap 50, 2006 rev edn) (Companies Act (Singapore)), which contain the Chapter 11 provisions 
(with modifications). 
14  There is a rich literature on legal transplants and their effectiveness or otherwise. The classic work here is 
A Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press 1974) and for a 
retrospective assessment see J W Cairns, ‘Watson, Walton, and the History of Legal Transplants’ (2013) 41 Georgia 
Journal of International and Comparative Law 637. See generally on the ‘political’ dimensions of transplants O 
Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 MLR 1; L Bebchuk and M Roe, ‘A Theory of 
Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance’ (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review 127. 
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environments. Legal concepts tend to behave differently in different countries and the importation 
of a new concept may have unintended consequences for the rest of the body of law.15 While one 
should not preclude the possibility of borrowing from other countries, a good fit of foreign with 
domestic law would be enhanced by meaningful adaptation of imported laws to local conditions.16 
In this article, we argue that Singapore’s adaptation of Chapter 11 provisions may lead to a shift 
in leverage to shareholders and/or management at the expense of junior creditors; further, more 
emphasis will be placed on valuation fights in the context of cram-down and on whether the duties 
of directors and scheme managers have been properly discharged. We also suggest that the success 
of the 2017 reforms will at least partly depend on recognition of the Singapore schemes overseas. 
Our study on the Singapore experience will be relevant to other common law jurisdictions 
that are considering transplanting Chapter 11 provisions into their restructuring and insolvency 
framework. While this is a study on the Singapore experience, we have also made comparison with 
the UK’s restructuring and insolvency laws and experiences for the following reasons. First, like 
the UK, Singapore’s insolvency regime has traditionally been ‘creditor friendly’ or, more 
particularly, ‘secured creditor friendly’. Second, the UK also uses the scheme of arrangement as a 
debt restructuring tool and while the scheme is highly flexible, it has its limitations as this regard. 
Third, the UK is considering legislative changes to its insolvency framework and the reservations 
expressed in the course of this legislative deliberation are likely to be relevant also in the Singapore 
context. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Part II discusses the limitations of the 
existing mechanisms of debt restructuring framework prior to 23 May 2017 (being the date on 
which the 2017 reforms came into force), and how the gaps are intended to be filled by 
incorporating certain Chapter 11 provisions. Part III discusses how the Chapter 11 provisions have 
been incorporated into Singapore’s insolvency laws, with the focus on moratoria, super priority 
rescue financing, cross creditor class cram-downs and pre-packaged procedures. Part IV discusses 
the key challenges and possible unintended consequences. Part V concludes. 
  
                                               
15  See D Berkowitz, K Pistor and JF Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’ (2003) 51 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 163 and see also J Armour, S Deakin, P Lele, and M Siems, ‘How Do Legal Rules Evolve? 
Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor and Worker Protection’ (2009) 57 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 79; G Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends 
up in New Divergences’ (1998) 61 MLR 11. 
16  See generally on the role of existing legal norms in shaping subsequent legal developments H Spamann, 
‘Contemporary Legal Transplants – Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law’ (2010) 2009 Brigham 
Young University Law Review 1813; see also W Twining, ‘Social Science and Diffusion of Law’ (2005) 32 Journal 
of Law and Society 203; W Twining ‘Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’ (2005) 49 Journal of Legal Pluralism 
1; D Cabrelli and M Siems, ‘Convergence, Legal Origins and Transplants in Comparative Corporate Law: A Case-
Based and Quantitative Analysis’ (2015) 63 American Journal of Comparative Law 109. 
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II. LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING MECHANISMS OF THE DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
FRAMEWORK IN THE UK AND SINGAPORE AND THE RELEVANCE OF 
CHAPTER 11 
 
A. Limitations of the Existing Debt Restructuring Framework: the Scheme of Arrangement 
 
In the UK, there are three possible statutory mechanisms available for corporate restructuring: a 
company voluntary arrangement (CVA), a scheme of arrangement and an administration.17 
Singapore has the scheme of arrangement (which is modelled upon the UK scheme of 
arrangement) and judicial management. Judicial management is the functional equivalent of the 
original UK administration order procedure as introduced in 1986 and before it was substantially 
revised by the Enterprise Act 2002 which allowed an administrator to be appointed either by the 
debtor company or a general secured creditor out–of-court. Singapore does not have the equivalent 
of a CVA or the UK administration procedure introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002.  
In the UK, only the CVA and the scheme of arrangement involve ‘debtor in possession’.18 
There is no management displacement in favour of an external insolvency practitioner. The 
company management can prepare a restructuring plan and submit it to creditors though obviously 
in practice there is likely to be a high degree of interaction and consultation with creditors in 
formulating the detailed terms of the plan and making sure that it is likely to meet with creditor 
approval. The usage of CVA has been low for various reasons, including the fact that it does not 
bind secured or preferential creditors.19 On the other hand, the UK scheme was once described as 
a blunderbuss and somewhat cumbersome20 but it is now used as a powerful debt restructuring 
tool altering in various ways the financial obligations of companies.21 Its use in this regard have 
been commented upon by Snowden J in Re Van Gansewinkel Groep BV22 as follows: 
  
The use of schemes of arrangement in this way has been prompted by an understandable 
desire to save the companies in question from formal insolvency proceedings which would 
be destructive of value for creditors and lead to substantial loss of jobs. The inherent 
flexibility of a scheme of arrangement has proved particularly valuable in such cases where 
the existing financing agreements do not contain provisions permitting voluntary 
                                               
17  See discussion in J Payne, ‘Debt restructuring in English law: lessons from the United States and the need 
for reform’ (2014) LQR 282.   
18  It should be noted that CVAs and schemes of arrangement may be coupled with administration in which 
case they are no longer debtor-in-possession. Likewise, in Singapore, the scheme may be coupled with judicial 
management. See generally on debtor-in-possession versus creditor-in-possession see D Hahn, ‘Concentrated 
Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganizations’ (2004) 4 JCLS 117; S Franken, ‘Creditor - and Debtor-
Oriented Corporate Bankruptcy Regimes Revisited’ (2004) 5 EBOR 645. 
19  J Payne, ‘Debt restructuring in English law: lessons from the United States and the need for reform’ (n 17), 
289. 
20  Sir Kenneth Cork, Insolvency Law and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (Cmnd 8558, 1982) para 
419 and see also The Insolvency Service, Report of the Joint DTI/Treasury Review of Company Rescue and 
Business Reconstructions Mechanisms (May 2000) para 43. 
21  See generally C Pilkington, Schemes of Arrangement in Corporate Restructuring (2nd edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2017); G O’Dea, J Long and A Smyth, Schemes of Arrangement Law and Practice (Oxford University 
Press 2012); J Payne, Schemes of Arrangement; Theory, Structure and Operation (Cambridge University Press 
2014).  See also LC Ho, ‘Making and enforcing international schemes of arrangement’ (2011) 26 JIBLR 434; J 
Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and Forum Shopping’ (2013) 14 EBOR 563. 
22  [2015] EWHC 2151, [5]. 
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modification of their terms by an achievable majority of creditors, or in cases of pan-
European groups of companies where co-ordination of rescue procedures or formal 
insolvency proceedings across more than one country would prove impossible or very 
difficult to achieve without substantial difficulty, delay and expense. 
 
Likewise, the Singapore scheme of arrangement features prominently as a restructuring tool, and 
a recent study has shown that it has generally been successful.23 
The scheme of arrangement provisions are found in the companies legislation in the UK24 
and Singapore respectively25 but the law has also been developed substantially by judicial 
interpretation. Essentially, the scheme procedure involves an arrangement between a company and 
its creditors and/or members with some element of ‘give and take’ on both sides. The sanctioning 
of a scheme is a three-stage procedure with firstly, an application to the court to convene relevant 
meetings of creditors or members of a company. Secondly, the relevant class meetings are held 
and the scheme is required to be approved by 75 per cent in value and a majority in number of 
creditors within each class.26 The third stage involves the scheme coming before the court for 
approval. The court must be satisfied that the scheme proposed is a reasonable one such that a 
reasonable member of the class concerned and acting in respect of its own interests could have 
voted for it.27 While the court is not a rubber stamp, it need not be satisfied that the scheme 
proposed is the only fair one.28 Thus, the court must be satisfied that not only the statutory 
provisions have been observed, the relevant class must have been fairly represented by those who 
attended the meeting and that the statutory majority were acting bona fide and not coercing the 
minority in order to promote interests adverse to those of the class they purport to represent. The 
court addresses whether an intelligent and honest person, a member of the class concerned and 
acting in respect of its own interest, might reasonably approve the scheme. 
While dissenting creditors within a class may be ‘crammed-down’, there is no scope for 
dissenting classes of creditors in their entirety to be ‘crammed-down’. This fact makes the 
composition of creditor classes very important in the context of a scheme of arrangement. It also 
leads to more complicated strategies with a view to ‘squeezing out’ dissenting creditors. To a 
certain extent, the courts have aided scheme proponents through their interpretations of the class 
composition rules. It has been held that questions on class composition should be determined at 
the convening hearing stage rather than later at the hearing to sanction the scheme.29 In addition, 
the relevant test to work out the constitution of classes is whether creditors have different legal 
                                               
23  2013 Report (n 10) 135. 
24  Companies Act 2006 (UK), Part 26. 
25  Companies Act (Singapore), section 210. 
26  In Singapore (but not in the UK), the court in sanctioning the scheme may prescribe a different majority 
than a majority in number for the headcount test, though it must still represent 75 per cent in value: Companies Act 
(Singapore), section 210(4).  See Ministry of Finance, Report of the Steering Committee for the Review of the 
Companies Act: Consultation Paper (June 2011) [3-35] – [3-38]. 
27  See Anglo-Continental Supply Co Ltd [1922] 2 Ch 723, 736. 
28  It has been pointed out that the test is not whether the opposing creditors have reasonable objections to the 
scheme since a creditor might be acting equally reasonably in voting either for or against the scheme.  In these 
circumstances, the English courts consider that creditor democracy should prevail: see Re British Aviation Insurance 
Co Ltd [2005] EWHC 1621, [75].   
29  Re Telewest Communications plc [2004] BCC 342 (approved by the English Court of Appeal in Re 
Telewest Communications plc [2005] BCC 29). In the Singapore context, see Royal Bank of Scotland NV v TT 
International (No 1) [2012] 2 SLR 213.  
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rights rather than separate interests that may stem from these legal rights.30 It has also been held 
that small differences in rights does not prevent creditors being placed in the same class.31 The 
courts take a ‘broad brush’ approach to avoid the situation where a minority group of creditors 
have an effective veto on whether the scheme should be approved.32 It is also the case that ‘lock-
up' agreements – small financial inducements given to creditors who vote in favour of the scheme 
proposals before a particular date – do not necessarily require that the creditors who are bound by 
the lockup agreement should be put in a separate class.33 
On alternatives to cross class creditor cram-down, it has been held that it is only necessary 
to get the consent of those with economic interest in proposed restructuring. Schemes might 
therefore be used to ‘squeeze out’ creditors who are ‘out of the money’ as in Re MyTravel plc34 
and the Re IMO Carwash35. In broad essence, company assets are transferred to a 'newco' together 
with some liabilities of creditors who are 'in the money' but 'out of the money' creditors are left 
stranded with claims against the 'oldco' which no longer has any assets. Such schemes usually 
implemented as part of 'pre-packaged’ administration and are generally referred to as ‘prepack’ or 
‘business transfer’ schemes.  
Administration is the UK procedure designed for ailing companies involving the 
appointment of an external administrator (insolvency practitioner or IP) and the displacement of 
the board of directors and the existing management team in favour of the IP. The administrator is 
mandated to address the rescue of all or part of the company’s business, achieving a more 
advantageous realisation of the company’s assets than could be achieved in a liquidation and 
making distributions to secured and preferential creditors. Despite the absence of any explicit 
statutory authorisation, the courts have given their blessing to ‘prepackaged’ administrations 
which involve the sale of all or part of the company’s business normally to a pre-arranged 
purchaser once the administrator has been appointed.36  
Under the ‘business transfer’ scheme, the assets or business of the company is normally 
transferred to a new creditor owned company with the latter assuming an agreed amount of the 
company’s existing liabilities equaling to or exceeding the value of the business or assets being 
transferred. The transfer is carried out by administrators who are appointed once the scheme has 
been sanctioned. There is no need however, to obtain the approval of junior creditors who no 
longer have any economic interest in the business, given the current value of the business. These 
junior ‘out of the money’ creditors are left behind in the old scheme company with their rights 
unaltered but now essentially valueless since the ‘oldco’ has been stripped of assets. 
                                               
30  In re Hellenic & General Trust Ltd [1976] 1WLR 123; UDL Argos Engineering & Heavy Industries Co Ltd 
v Li Oi Lin [2001] 3 HKLRD 634. In the Singapore context, see Royal Bank of Scotland NV v TT International (No 
1) [2012] 2 SLR 213. 
31  Sovereign Life Assurance Co v Dodd [1892] 2 QB 573 (a scheme class confined to those “persons whose 
rights are not so dissimilar to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest”). 
32  See Chadwick LJ in Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2001] 2 BCLC 480, [33], suggesting that the relevant tests 
should not be applied in such a way that they become an instrument of oppression by a minority. 
33  See Re Global Garden Products Italy SpA [2016] EWHC 1884. 
34  See Re My Travel Group plc [2004] EWHC 2741 (Ch) and Re Tea Corp Ltd [1904] 1 Ch 12. For a general 
discussion, see CL Seah, ‘The Re Tea Corporation Principle and Junior Creditors’ Rights to Participate in a Scheme 
of Arrangement: A View from Singapore’ (2011) 20 International Insolvency Review 161.  
35  This case is also referred to as Re Bluebrook [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch). 
36  See generally P Walton ‘Pre-Packaged Administrations – Trick or Treat’ (2006) Insolvency Intelligence 
113; see also V Finch ‘Pre-packaged administrations: bargains in the shadow of insolvency or shadowy bargains?’ 
[2006] JBL 568. 
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Business transfer schemes may be complex but they also give rise to questions of fairness 
and procedural propriety.37 The courts consider the question of valuation at the sanction stage but 
there may be difficult questions about where the debt structure the value ‘breaks’; how one assesses 
value and what is the relevant comparator for assessing fairness and value – whether it is 
liquidation value, going concern value, or something else? 38 
Quite apart from the difficulties involving pre-packs, there are however, a number of 
limitations with schemes of arrangement in the UK and Singapore. The first limitation relates to 
the lack of a wide-ranging wide moratorium to allow the company the time to restructure its 
operations. In the UK, there is no specific statutory moratorium on proceedings or enforcement 
proceedings against a company when scheme proposals are being considered though a limited 
moratorium has been developed judicially.39 In contrast, while Singapore has had a statutory 
provision40 for a moratorium/stay on proceedings against the debtor company, this stay was 
somewhat limited in that it did not cover enforcement actions by secured creditors nor the 
forfeiture of leases.41 
Second, the UK (and Singapore) scheme remains more a dedicated debt restructuring 
procedure rather than a fully blown corporate/business rescue procedure. The scheme of 
arrangement lacks certain aspects of the US Chapter 11 such as an executory contracts regime – a 
facility to deal with contracts not yet performed by the debtor.42 Many contracts contain so-called 
‘ipso facto’ clauses allowing, for instance, suppliers to terminate or modify a long-term supply 
arrangement if the counterparty enters formal insolvency or restructuring proceedings or more 
generally experiences financial difficulties. Subject to certain protections for contractual 
counterparties, a Chapter 11 debtor may ‘cherry-pick’ among outstanding contracts rejecting 
financially disadvantageous ones. 
Third, there is no ability to cram-down a dissenting class of creditors in a scheme of 
arrangement. This results in an excessive emphasis on the classification of creditors, with the result 
that creditors placed in a different class tend to bargain for excessive rights. The extensive case 
law surrounding the classification of creditors underscores the point.43 Fourth, there is a lack of a 
formal structure for grant of priority and/or super-priority for rescue financing. New financing may 
be critical to the rehabilitation of the company and the unavailability of such priority will limit the 
                                               
37  See generally M Crystal QC and R Mokal, ‘The Valuation of Distressed Companies: A Conceptual 
Framework Parts 1 and 11’ (2006) 3 International Corporate Rescue 63 and 123; N Segal, ‘Schemes of Arrangement 
and Junior Creditors – Does the US Approach to Valuations Provide the Answer?’ (2007) 20 Insolvency Intelligence 
49. 
38  For a general discussion of the issues see J Payne, ‘Debt restructuring in English law: lessons from the 
United States and the need for reform’ (n 17). In the UK, the Insolvency Service, A Review of the Corporate 
Insolvency Framework: A Consultation on Options for Reform (n 4) states at [9.9]: ‘The cram-down of a rescue plan 
onto “out of the money” creditors is currently possible in the UK only through a costly mix of using a ‘scheme of 
arrangement and an administration. The Government believes that developing a more sophisticated restructuring 
process with the ability to “cram-down” may facilitate more restructurings, and the subsequent survival of the 
corporate entity as a going concern.’ 
39  See BlueCrest Mercantile BV v Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group [2013] EWHC 1146.  
40  Companies Act (Singapore), section 210(10). 
41  2013 Report (n 10) 136: ‘[T]he protection afforded by the statutory moratorium provided at section 210(10) 
of the Companies Act is relatively weak compared with the moratoriums found in the liquidation or judicial 
management regimes.’ 
42  For a detailed cross-country comparison of this issue see D Faber et al., Treatment of Contracts in 
Insolvency (Oxford University Press 2013); for the classic definition in the US, see V Countryman, ‘Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy’ (1972) 57 Minnesota Law Review 439; (1973) 58 Minnesota Law Review 479. 
43  See discussion in nn 29-33 (and accompanying text). 
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options that are available to the company or its professionals in the restructuring. Simply put, 
without such priority, new lenders are at risk of being grouped together with other unsecured 
claimants should the restructuring fail and the company goes into liquidation.  
In view of the limitations of the scheme of arrangement procedure, the UK Insolvency 
Service has now suggested reforms including the introduction of a statutory moratorium as well 
as a dedicated new cram-down procedure.44 On cram-down, the proposals are somewhat lacking 
in detail but what is essentially proposed is a statutory, 12-month time-limited multi-class 
restructuring procedure to aid corporate rescue. The cram-down mechanism would allow a 
restructuring plan to be imposed on an impaired class provided that other classes have accepted 
the plan and that the impaired class would receive at least as much under the plan as they would 
do in a liquidation of the company. The proposals have since been revised to oblige the court in 
deciding whether or not to approve cram-down, to consider the most likely alternative scenario to 
a restructuring rather than confining itself to liquidation value per se.45 On rescue financing, the 
UK Insolvency Service had put forward certain options that were previously raised in an earlier 
2009 consultation,46 such as the giving of super-priority status to rescue finance costs in 
administration, and to override negative pledge clauses in security arrangements. However, as 
discussed below, the majority of respondents disagreed with these proposals.47 
In Singapore, the ILRC, comprising insolvency practitioners, academics and 
representatives from industry, and tasked to review Singapore’s bankruptcy and corporate 
insolvency regimes, released its final report in 2013. The ILRC recommended a number of changes 
to the schemes of arrangement and the judicial management process. These key recommendations 
are summarized as follows. First, it was proposed to broaden the availability of the moratorium so 
as to make it available when the company has an intention to propose a scheme (and not merely 
when the scheme has been proposed).48 However, it did not recommend Chapter 11’s worldwide 
automatic stay of proceedings on the grounds of possible abuse.49 
Second, measures were recommended to fill in certain gaps in the schemes of arrangement 
procedure, including rules on the proof of debts, the role of the scheme manager who is appointed 
to adjudicate on the scheme claims, and powers to allow a re-vote. Somewhat controversially, the 
majority also recommended a cram-down of classes of dissenting creditors but only in 
circumstances where there was a high degree of proof that dissenting classes were not prejudiced 
by the cram-down. The ILRC also recommended to a limited measure of super-priority for rescue 
financing but this would not include the overriding or ‘trumping’ of existing security interests.50 
The Singapore Government accepted most of the ILRC recommendations but in May 2015, 
before the recommendations were enacted, the Government appointed the Restructuring 
                                               
44  See the Insolvency Service, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A Consultation on Options 
for Reform (n 4). This consultation seeks views on whether the UK regime ‘needs updating in the light of 
international principles … recent large corporate failures and an increasing European focus on providing businesses 
with the tools to facilitate company rescue. It seeks to establish whether legislative change would improve the UK 
corporate insolvency regime and provide a better environment to achieve the successful rescue of a viable business’ 
(see p 4). 
45  The Insolvency Service, A Summary of Responses: A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework 
(September 2016). 
46  The Insolvency Service, Encouraging Company Rescue: A Consultation (June 2009). 
47  See the Insolvency Service, A Summary of Responses: A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework (n 
45). See n 108 - 111 (and accompanying text). 
48  2013 Report (n 10) 142. 
49  ibid 123 – 125. 
50  ibid 153. 
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Committee to consider reforms that would specifically enhance Singapore’s effectiveness as a 
centre for international debt restructuring. The Restructuring Committee made many wide-ranging 
recommendations, and in particular, the transplant of certain Chapter 11 features. The Government 
accepted the recommendations and Parliament passed the Companies (Amendment) Act of 2017 
to give effect to the changes.  
 
B. Relevance of Chapter 11 
 
The US Chapter 11 is seen as pro-restructuring for a number of reasons. First, it is easy to access 
by the debtor who generally has to file a petition with the court disclosing certain financial and 
other information. A court order is not however needed to activate the process and there are no 
other onerous conditions to be fulfilled. Moreover, the filing of a Chapter 11 petition brings about 
a worldwide moratorium on proceedings against the debtor or the debtor’s assets. The global 
economic reach of the US means that even creditors outside the US can ill-afford to ignore this 
stay. It is only where US contacts are non-existent that they can safely proceed with actions against 
the debtor.51 
Second, Chapter 11 also reflects a ‘debtor in possession’ norm by which is meant that prima 
facie, the existing management team remain in control of the company’s business rather than being 
displaced in favour of an external manager or administrator. In certain, though limited 
circumstances, the court may appoint a bankruptcy trustee to displace existing management and 
an outside examiner may also be appointed by the court to investigate and report on certain 
matters.52 It is the case however, that the composition of the management team may change 
significantly during the Chapter 11 period due generally to the altered financial circumstances or 
perhaps more specifically as a result of pressure from creditors.53 Creditors may exert powerful 
influence during the Chapter 11 process including through provisions in debtor-in-possession 
finance agreements – ‘DIP’ financing. Chapter 11 contains an extensive set of provisions on DIP 
finance but there is scope for the statutory regime to be supplemented by contractual agreements 
giving new finance providers power to influence the debtor’s behaviour. New finance may be 
contractually conditioned on the debtor taking certain actions, such as auctioning off specific 
assets, within a particular period.54 The statutory framework also allows the DIP lender to override 
                                               
51  See generally G McCormack, ‘US exceptionalism and UK localism? Cross-border insolvency law in 
comparative perspective’ (2016) 36 Legal Studies 136, 149.   
52  Section 1104(c)(2) seems to require the appointment of an examiner where the company’s unsecured, non-
trade and non-insider debt exceeds US$5m ie in every medium to large case but see: American Bankruptcy Institute 
(ABI), Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: Final Report and Recommendations (2012 – 2014) at 33: 
‘Whether the appointment of an examiner is truly mandatory in any given case has met with resistance by some 
courts and created a split in the law.’ 
53  For criticisms of Chapter 11 see eg DA Skeel, ‘Rethinking the line between Corporate Law and Corporate 
Bankruptcy’ (1994) 72 Texas Law Review 471, 535: ‘Like an antitakeover device, bankruptcy can impair the 
market’s ability to discipline managers because it may substitute reorganization procedures for market mechanisms 
that would otherwise lead to the ouster of managers outside of bankruptcy.’ But this criticism has largely fallen 
away with new forms of market governance in US bankruptcy cases – see DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘The End 
of Bankruptcy’ (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 751; DG Baird and RK Rasmussen, ‘Private Debt and the Missing 
Lever of Corporate Governance’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1209 but see B Adler, V 
Capkun and L Weiss, ‘Value Destruction in the New Era of Chapter 11’ (2013) 29 Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 461. 
54  See generally K Ayotte and E Morrison, ‘Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11’ (2009) 1 Journal of 
Legal Analysis 511 who find ‘pervasive creditor control’ (at 552). 
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existing security interests in certain circumstances though these circumstances are the exception 
rather than the rule and the DIP lender may in fact be an existing secured lender wearing a different 
hat.55 
Chapter 11 in more or less its current incarnation forms part of the US Bankruptcy Code 
since 1978 though there were earlier version which achieved similar results in somewhat different 
ways.56 But Chapter 11 has not stood still since 1978. There have been significant developments 
in the financial marketplace and this has led to changes in Chapter 11 practice with a stronger 
emphasis on ‘going concern’ sales of the company’s assets rather than reorganisations in the 
traditional sense. 57 In other words, the Chapter 11 process may lead to either the whole or partial 
sale of the assets of a business on the basis of a going concern rather than relevant stakeholders 
coming together under the protective umbrellas provided by Chapter 11 and agreeing on a 
restructuring plan. The relevant statistics can be interpreted in different ways but one estimate 
suggests that ‘roughly two-thirds of all large bankruptcy outcomes involve a sale of the firm, rather 
than a traditional negotiated reorganization in which debt is converted to equity through the 
reorganization plan’.58 Some of the difficulties in interpreting the relevant statistics comes from 
the fact that a company may be the subject of major changes in the course of its time in the Chapter 
11 process. It may be split into different businesses, shrink in size, change its name, change the 
management team, change the nature of its business or be sold to different owners.59 
One of the most important actors in the US bankruptcy and restructuring landscape – the 
American Bankruptcy Institute – has spoken of the need for reform of Chapter 11 given the 
significant changes since its first enactment. It has instanced in this connection the expanded use 
of secured credit, growth in distressed-debt markets as well as other factors that have impacted on 
the effectiveness of the current law.60 In 2014, it produced a comprehensive report61 that set out a 
long list of proposed changes to Chapter 11 though these are mainly in the detail rather than 
affecting the fundamental essence of Chapter 11. Later on, we will consider the proposed changes 
in terms of binding dissenting creditors to a restructuring plan – so-called ‘cross class creditor 
                                               
55  See K Li and W Wang, ‘Debtor-in-possession financing, loan-to-loan, and loan-to-own’ (2016) 39 Journal 
of Corporate Finance 212: ‘Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing has been the standard loan contract offered to 
firms in bankruptcy for their short-term liquidity needs since the early 1990s. Approximately 60 per cent of large 
public US firms that filed for Chapter 11 since then obtained such post-petition financing, primarily from pre-
petition bank lenders.’ 
56  See generally DA Skeel Jr, Debt’s Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in America (Princeton 
University Press 2001). 
57  See generally D Baird and R Rasmussen, ‘The End of Bankruptcy’ (2002) 55 Stanford Law Review 751; 
‘Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance’ (2006) 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
120; DA Skeel, ‘Creditors' Ball: The “New” New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ (2003) 152 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 917. 
58  See K Ayotte and DA Skeel, ‘Bankruptcy or Bailouts’ (2010) 35 Journal of Corporation Law 469, 477: 
‘[R]oughly two-thirds of all large bankruptcy outcomes involve a sale of the firm, rather than a traditional negotiated 
reorganization in which debt is converted to equity through the reorganization plan’. But for another perspective on 
the available data see LM Lopucki and JW Doherty, ‘Bankruptcy Survival’ (2015) 62 UCLA Law Review 970. 
59  See LM Lopucki and JD, ‘Bankruptcy Survival’, ibid 979. 
60  See E Altman, ‘The Role of Distressed Debt Markets, Hedge Funds and Recent Trends in Bankruptcy on 
the Outcomes of Chapter 11 Reorganizations’ (2014) 22 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 75. 
61  American Bankruptcy Institute, Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: Final Report and 
Recommendations (n 52). 
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cram-down’ though it seems unlikely that these proposed reforms will be enacted in the near 
future.62 
 
 
III. INTRODUCTION OF CHAPTER 11 FEATURES INTO SINGAPORE’S 
INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK 
 
The 2017 reforms introduce Chapter 11 features into both the schemes of arrangement and the 
judicial management procedures. Under the reforms, judicial management becomes easier to 
access. A judicial management order may be made by the court where it considers it merely likely 
that the company will be unable to pay its debts as distinct from a probability of this occurring.63 
The secured creditor veto on the making of a judicial management order which hitherto generally 
existed in Singapore has also been weakened.64 The court is now required to apply a balancing of 
harms test though the general secured creditor bears the burden of establishing that it would be 
caused disproportionately greater prejudice by the making of a judicial management order than 
unsecured creditors would be caused by its refusal.65 
While it is now possible to make a judicial management in respect of a company registered 
overseas,66 it is clear that the scheme procedure is seen as the main vehicle for Singapore to flex 
its strength in the international debt restructuring arena.67 On the basic issue of jurisdiction and 
discretion, there is clarification of the circumstances in which the courts may approve schemes. In 
some respects, the scheme jurisdiction may be seen as potentially ‘exorbitant’ since that it may 
interfere with the disposition by foreign sovereign powers of matters within their own territories. 
There is also the practical concern of ensuring that the court only made orders where some useful 
purpose would be served. In the UK, ‘sufficient connection’ test has been used as the overriding 
criterion for determining whether the court should exercise its discretion to make a winding-up 
order in respect of a foreign company68 and the same ‘sufficient connection’ test has been used in 
relation to exercising the jurisdiction to sanction a scheme of arrangement in relation to a foreign 
registered company.69 The UK courts have sanctioned schemes where the relevant foreign 
                                               
62  For detailed criticism of the ABI’s report, see Loan Syndications and Trading Association (LSTA), The 
Trouble with Unneeded Bankruptcy Reform: The LSTA’s Response to the ABI Commission Report (October 2015) 9: 
‘If adopted, these reforms risk disrupting the operation of a bankruptcy system that has served the nation very 
well—aiding in the economic recovery from the Great Recession—and that has become the envy of the world. They 
also threaten to increase the cost of credit to both performing and distressed businesses, which will in turn hurt the 
very businesses that the proposals are designed to help’. 
63  Companies Act (Singapore), section 227B(1). 
64  Companies Act (Singapore), section 227B(5). 
65  Companies Act (Singapore), section 227B(5). 
66  Companies Act (Singapore), section 227AA. 
67  The judicial management has not been regarded as a success: see 2013 Report (n 10) 82 – 88. 
68  In Re Real Estate Development Co [1991] 1 BCLC 210, 217, Knox J referred to a sufficient connection that 
would justify the court in setting in motion its winding-up procedures over a body that was prima facie beyond the 
limits of territoriality. The test can be criticised for being somewhat circular but it does enable a wide range of 
factors to be brought into the reckoning including benefit to the petitioner whether through the presence of corporate 
assets in the UK or otherwise. Knox J also talked about a reasonable possibility of benefit accruing to the applicants 
for a winding-up and a person or persons interested in the distribution of the assets being persons over whom the 
court can exercise jurisdiction. 
69  See Re Seat Pagine Gialle SpA [2012] EWHC 3686; Primacom Holdings GmbH v Credit Agricole [2011] 
EWHC 3746; Re Rodenstock GmbH [2011] EWHC 1104 and see generally LC Ho, ‘Making and enforcing 
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company has a ‘sufficient connection’ with the UK, even though its centre of main interest (Comi) 
is not in the UK. It may be enough that all or some of the scheme creditors are domiciled in the 
UK; where the scheme purports to modify obligations governed by UK law or where there is a UK 
choice of forum clause. It seems that the Singapore courts will exercise their scheme jurisdiction 
in relation to foreign companies on a largely similar basis and this has now been put on a statutory 
footing.70 
The new legislative dispensation strengthens the stay to cover these matters and moreover, 
there is now an automatic 30-day initial stay/moratorium on proceedings etc. against the debtor 
and the stay can be extended to cover entities related to the debtor. The new dispensation also 
makes provision for the possibility of’ ‘prepacks’- ‘prepackaged’ schemes; for super-priority new 
finance and also for cross-class creditor cram-down though not in the case of 'prepacks'. 
 
A. The Moratorium 
 
The stay/moratorium on creditor enforcement action is a key feature of Chapter 11 enabling the 
debtor to preserve assets that may be essential for the carrying on of its business and giving it the 
breathing space to prepare restructuring proposals.71 The stay addresses the ‘anti-commons’ 
problem of blocking actions by individual creditors who are seeking to frustrate the wishes of the 
majority.72 As outlined above, the US the filing of a Chapter 11 petition brings about a worldwide 
automatic stay on proceedings against debtor or its assets and because of the global economic 
reach and power of the US this stay cannot be ignored unless an affected party has no US 
connections.73 The new Singapore law adopts some of these features from Chapter 11 and 
enhances enormously the existing Singapore stay. There is now an automatic 30 day interim stay 
on the filing of a moratorium application and the stay is expanded to cover both the enforcement 
of security and the forfeiture of leases. The interim stay may be extended on application to the 
court. 
In the 2013 Report, the ILRC considered the possibility that a stay should be triggered 
automatically upon the filing of a scheme application but declined to make a positive 
recommendation in this regard.74 The 2016 Report took a somewhat different view however, and 
suggested a certain ‘streamlining of procedure’.75 This latter view is now reflected in the new 
legislation which in line with the Restructuring Committee’s recommendations, also contains 
certain safeguards against abuse.76 These include the requirement that certain evidence must be 
                                               
international schemes of arrangement’ (2011) 26 JIBLR 434; J Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and 
Forum Shopping’ (n 21). 
70  Re TPC Korea Co Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 617; Companies Act (Singapore), section 211A(3) read with s 351.  
71   See HR Rep No 595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 340 (1977): ‘The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor 
protections provided by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops all 
collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or 
reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy’. 
72  For a discussion of ‘anti-commons’ problems, see D Baird and R Rasmussen, ‘Anti-bankruptcy’ (2010) 
119 Yale LJ 648 and, more generally, MA Heller, ‘The tragedy of the anticommons: property in the transition from 
Marx to markets’ (1998) 111 Harv L Rev 622. 
73  On the worldwide effect of the US automatic stay see: In re Nortel Networks Inc (2011) 669 F 3d 128.  
74  2013 Report (n 10) 141. 
75  ibid 10. 
76  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211B.  
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filed with the court to support the stay application including evidence of support from creditors 
whose support is important for the success of the proposed scheme.77 There is also a prohibition 
against repeat stay applications attracting the automatic moratorium within 12 months.78 The stay 
application may be made in advance of the application to the court for an order convening meetings 
of creditors to approve the proposed scheme but in this scenario, the creditors must undertake to 
the court to make the other application as soon as practicable.79 
 The court may extend the automatic 30-day interim stay but, in this case, more stringent 
information requirements are likely to be required to be satisfied by the applicant for an 
extension.80 The stay may also be given worldwide in personam effect provided that the Singapore 
court has jurisdiction over affected creditors or their assets.81 Under the case law as developed in 
the English courts, creditors may be restrained by injunction from pursuing foreign proceedings 
where the conduct of such creditors is oppressive, vexatious or otherwise unfair or improper.82 
There are suggestions that the Singapore courts would adopt a similar approach in the absence of 
statutory guidance but the 2016 Report suggested that an express statutory statement would have 
a greater visibility internationally. The Committee said at para 3.14: 
 
Express provisions for this injunctive relief should therefore allow the Singapore courts to 
make an order to stay creditors, who are based in Singapore or having sufficient nexus to 
Singapore such as to invoke the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts, from taking action 
globally (i.e. similar in nature to the in personam effect of an anti-suit injunction). This 
injunctive relief is useful as it leverages on Singapore’s status as an international financial 
hub and can bind creditors registered in and/or operating from Singapore from taking 
actions that might frustrate a restructuring. 
 
The 2017 reforms allow the stay to be extended to entities related to the debtor.83 Various 
conditions have to be met to the satisfaction of the court including the fact that that the related 
company plays a ‘necessary and integral role’ in the debtor’s scheme and the creditors of the 
related company will not be unfairly prejudiced by an extension order.84 In making the case for 
this legislative innovation, the 2016 Report pointed to the fact that many businesses organise 
themselves across a corporate group structure and that ‘a restructuring can potentially be frustrated 
if creditors are able to take action against related corporate entities that are a necessary and integral 
part of the restructuring plan.’85 
It should be noted however, that that there is no express statutory authority for such an 
extension in the US Chapter 11 though there is judicial authority. Reliance has been placed on  
section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code which allows US courts to ‘issue any order, process, or 
judgment that is necessary or appropriate’ to implement the provisions of the Code as a sufficient 
                                               
77  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211B(4). 
78  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211B(9). 
79  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211B(4)(b). 
80  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211B(8) read with s 211B(7). See also 2016 Report (n 11) 11. 
81  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211B(5). 
82  The leading case is now the decision of the Privy Council in Stichting Shell Pensioenfonds v Krys [2014] 
UKPC 41 and see generally the case for a more extensive stay under UK law: H Anderson, ‘The Extra-Territoriality 
of the Statutory Stay in an English Administration’ (2004) 23 International Insolvency Review 40. 
83  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211C. 
84  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211C(2). 
85  2016 Report (n 11) 21. 
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base for extending the protections of the automatic stay to non-debtors. It seems that in the US, 
the courts apply a fact-specific analysis to determine whether the stay applies to non-debtor entities 
as well as the debtor itself. Nevertheless, it is only in ‘unusual circumstances’ where the interests 
of a debtor and non-debtor are very closely related that the stay can reach the non-debtor party. It 
was held in the leading case of AH Robins Co v Piccinin86 that ‘unusual circumstances’ exist when 
the non-debtor party establishes that ‘there is such identity between the debtor and the non-debtor 
that the debtor may be said to be the real party defendant and that a judgment against the non-
debtor will in effect be a judgment or findings against the debtor.’ In another leading case, Queenie 
Ltd v Nygard International,87 it was held that the automatic stay can apply to non-debtors if a claim 
against the non-debtor will have ‘an immediate adverse economic consequence for the debtor’s 
estate’. 
In terms of detailed drafting, the new Singapore provisions also depart from Chapter 11 in 
respect of modification or discharge of the stay. Lengthy restructuring proceedings and, in 
particular those involving a stay on the enforcement of security interests, effectively transfer 
wealth to managers and shareholders at the expense of creditors. Creditors are prevented from 
realising their security but company managers may keep their jobs and shareholders may also 
benefit from the company being kept afloat during the restructuring period. In Chapter 11, a 
secured creditor, together with other affected parties, can apply to have the so-called automatic 
stay lifted and there is also specific requirement of ‘adequate protection’ for those holding property 
rights who are adversely affected by the stay.88 Chapter 11 provides examples of ‘adequate 
protection’ though there is no definition of the concept as such.89 It is only the value of the security 
interest however, that is entitled to adequate protection90 and an under-secured creditor may be in 
a position of footing the bill for an unsuccessful restructuring attempt. The stay prevents it from 
enforcing the security interest but it is not entitled to interest during what may be a lengthy period 
while the debtor is in Chapter 11. The over-secured creditor is in a much stronger position however, 
since it is condition of the court approving the restructuring plan that it should be paid interest out 
of the ‘excess’ security.  
In Singapore, the new statutory provisions are broad and flexible. The stay order may be 
made subject to conditions and a creditor may also seek a court order discharging the stay or 
modifying its scope.91 The more detailed US provisions may be used to shape judicial discretion 
in Singapore when courts are exercising the new powers. Guidance might also be drawn from the 
UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency which suggests that while the stay lasts, a secured 
creditor is entitled to protection of the value of the asset in which it has a security interest with 
appropriate measures of protection including cash payments by the debtor’s estate, provision of 
additional security interests, or such other means as the court determines.92 
                                               
86  (1986) 788 F 2d 994, 999. 
87  (2003) 321 F 3d 282, 287. 
88  Bankruptcy Code (US), s 361. 
89 The examples given are cash payments, additional or replacement security interests on other property and, 
unusually expressed, something that will give the creditor the ‘indubitable equivalent’ of its security interest.  
90  See Re Alyucan (1981) 12 BR 803, where the court rejected the view that the preservation of a certain 
collateral-to-debt ratio was part of the creditor’s property interest that warranted protection. See also United Savings 
Association of Texas v Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates Ltd (1988) 484 US 365, where the Supreme Court held 
that the adequate protection provision did not entitle an under-secured creditor to compensation for the delay caused 
by the stay in enforcing the security.  
91  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211D.  
92  See Recommendation 50 of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency. 
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It should also be noted that in Singapore there are specific provisions against debtor 
misconduct during the stay period. A creditor may also apply for an order preventing the debtor 
from: (i) disposing of assets other than in good faith and in the ordinary course of business; (ii) 
engaging in conduct that materially prejudices creditors or significantly diminishes the debtor's 
assets; or (iii) changing the composition of the debtor-company's shareholders.93 
 
B. A New Finance Regime in Singapore Including Super-priority 
 
As outlined above, the 2016 Report suggested that provisions for super-priority new finance should 
be introduced in Singapore.94 It argued that such finance formed a vital plank to the DIP financing 
industry in the US, and the existence of similar provisions should encourage established players in 
the US DIP financing industry to make available rescue financing in Singapore. It also said that 
‘rescue financing often amounts to a small portion of the total debt and any prejudice caused to 
existing secured lenders must be balanced against the possibility that the rescue financing may 
improve restructuring prospects substantially’.95 
More generally, the importance of a super priority new finance facility has often been 
stressed in the context of resolving both ‘debt overhang’ problems, i.e. existing assets being fully 
secured,96 and also those of ‘underinvestment’, i.e. lack of incentives to finance value-generating 
projects.97 In the US, this form of financing is seen as attractive to bank lenders because it may 
come with substantial upfront fees, higher margins and a strong portfolio of covenants that may 
restrict the debtor’s activities. Reference has also been made to the fact that ‘[t]he market for DIP 
financing has developed significantly in the past decade, in particular with alternative investors, 
such as hedge funds and private equity (PE) funds, emerging as new breeds of financiers … DIP 
loans provided by activist institutional investors often have trigger clauses allowing lenders to 
replace senior debt with newly issued equity upon case resolution, becoming an important route 
for the “loan-to-own” strategy’.98 
 Following on from the recommendations in the 2016 Report, the 2017 reforms 
contains a new financing regime for companies in the course of restructuring proceedings 
including the possibility of super-priority new finance overriding existing security interests. These 
reforms99 follow closely those in section 364 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Under certain 
conditions, including the unavailability of credit on less favourable terms and adequate protection 
of the interests of existing secured creditors, the Singapore court may authorise the debtor to raise 
                                               
93  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211D.  
94  2016 Report (n 11) 37 – 39. 
95  ibid 38. 
96 See European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment: Accompanying 
the document, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring 
frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge 
procedures and amending Directive 2012/13 EU’ SWD (2016) 357 Final, 158, which refers to ‘debt overhang’ as a 
situation where a firm’s high debt levels act as a disincentive to new investment. 
97  See generally G McCormack, ‘Super-priority New Financing and Corporate Rescue’ (2007) Journal of 
Business Law 701; G Triantis, ‘A Theory of the Regulation of Debtor-in-Possession Financing’ (1993) 46 
Vanderbilt Law Review 901; S Dahiya, K John, M Puri and G Ramirez, ‘Debtor-in-Possession Financing and 
Bankruptcy Resolution: Empirical Evidence’ (2003) 69 Journal of Financial Economics 259. 
98  K Li and W Wang, ‘Debtor-in-possession financing, loan-to-loan and loan-to-own’ (n 55); see also AFME, 
Frontier Economics and Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, Potential economic gains from reforming insolvency law in 
Europe, n 7, at 18. 
99  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211E.  
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new financing, even on a super-priority basis, provided such financing is deemed necessary to 
enable the debtor to continue as a going concern.100 The law provides some detail as to what 
constitutes adequate protection – cash payments, additional or replacement security or something 
that is the ‘indubitable equivalent’.101 This is Chapter 11 language that does not appear to have a 
precedent in the pre-existing Singapore statute book. It seems that in the US, the ‘adequate 
protection’ criterion is strictly interpreted and that the courts will only authorise super-priority new 
finance if it finds there is sufficient value in the property subject to the security (collateral) to 
support both the existing and new loans.102More generally, it has been suggested that certain 
guidelines that should be adhered to in a new financing regime such as ‘(i) effective notice to pre-
filing creditors and the ability of those creditors to object; (ii) thresholds for the debtor to qualify 
for such financing, for example a requirement that the debtor demonstrate that it cannot adequately 
finance itself without the priority being granted; (iii) a menu of relevant criteria to balance benefit 
and prejudice, such as considering whether any creditors will be materially prejudiced and whether 
the financing enhances the prospects of a viable business in the future; and (iv) a role for the court 
in resolving disputes, ensuring fairness to stakeholders, and serving as an accountability check’.103 
The 2017 reforms largely observes these guidelines.104 In a recent High Court decision in Re 
Attilan,105 the court was cautious to grant super-priority status, holding that the conditions set out 
in the legislation must be strictly complied with. In particular, there must be evidence that the 
debtor company has undertaken reasonable steps to secure financing without such super-priority 
and had been successful.  The importance of adhering to the threshold was underscored in a recent 
High Court decision in Re Attilan,106 where the court held that there must be evidence that the 
debtor company has undertaken reasonable steps to secure financing without such super-priority 
and had been unsuccessful. 
Nevertheless, super-priority new finance remains controversial not least because of its 
potential to ‘trump’ existing priority rules. As outlined above, similar proposals for super-priority 
new finance in a restructuring context have so far been resisted in the UK and EU.107  
   
In the UK, differences in business culture and economic environment have been cited in 
this connection.108 There are concerns about bringing about a situation that would essentially 
                                               
100  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211E(1). 
101  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211E(6). 
102  For a full discussion, see American Bankruptcy Institute, Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: 
Final Report and Recommendations (n 52), 73-79, including on how abuses associated with super-priority new 
financing might be checked. 
103  See J Payne and J Sarra, ‘Tripping the Light Fantastic: A Comparative Analysis of the European 
Commission's Proposals for New and Interim Financing of Insolvent Businesses’ (2017) Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper 41/2017, 34 – 35 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2976446>. 
104  Observance is seen as follows: (1) notice to each creditor is required (Companies Act (Singapore), section 
211E(2)), (2) the threshold that the debtor must demonstrate that it would not have been able to obtain the rescue 
financing from any person unless the debt is secured (s 211E(1)(c)(ii)); (3) balance of benefit and prejudice to 
existing creditors (section 211E(1)(d)); and (4) the court orders that can be made to ensure that there is adequate 
protection to existing creditors (section 211E(6)). 
105  [2017] SGHC 283. 
106  [2017] SGHC 283. 
107  The call for such a regime was made in a study by AFME/Frontier Economics that advocated EU 
legislative action: see AFME, Frontier Economics and Weil, Gotshal and Manges LLP, Potential economic gains 
from reforming insolvency law in Europe (n 7) 18.   
108  See the parliamentary debates on the Enterprise Bill; in particular House of Lords debates for 29th July 
2002 and the discussion in Stephen Davies, Insolvency and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Jordans 2003) 20 – 26, 
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guarantee a return to lenders providing funds on a super-priority basis without regard to the 
commercial viability of the restructuring proposals. The view was that decisions about lending to 
a distressed business was a commercial one that was best left to the market place and to business 
judgment. Potential lenders could consider the viability of the restructuring proposals, any 
unencumbered free assets that might serve as collateral, lower-ranking security and the possibility 
of obtaining security releases from existing lenders.   
The possibility of reform was considered in conjunction with the Enterprise Act reforms in 
2002, again in 2009109 and most recently in the 2016 Insolvency Service consultation reviewing 
the Corporate Insolvency Framework.110 The market reaction remained hostile and cautioned 
against introducing a US style new financing regime.111 Moreover, it may be noted that under the 
World Bank Doing Business ‘Resolving Insolvency’ indicators, the highest marks are given to 
countries that have a new financing framework but only where there is no provision for super-
priority over existing secured debt.112 In general, the ‘Resolving Insolvency’ indicators follow the 
standards laid down in the US Chapter 11 but in this respect there is a notable departure. 
 
C. Cross Class Creditor cram-down 
 
The 2017 reforms have also followed the US in terms of cross class creditor cram-down with some 
differences; most notably the differences lie in the fact that cram-down is more difficult to 
accomplish in a Singapore context because of the requirement that 75 per cent in value of creditors 
should approve a scheme rather than merely one impaired class of creditors. Cross class creditor 
cram-down is now possible in a Singapore scheme once three basic conditions have been satisfied 
– the existing class consent requirements are satisfied in respect of at least one class; creditors 
representing a majority in number and at least 75 per cent in value of total claims against the 
debtor for which votes are actually cast vote in favour and thirdly, the court is satisfied that the 
scheme is ‘fair and equitable’ to dissenting creditors and does not ‘discriminate unfairly’ between 
two or more classes of creditors.113 
The ‘fair and equitable’ and ‘unfair discrimination’ requirements are concepts based upon the 
cram-down provisions in section of 1129 of the US Bankruptcy Code and the US precedents can 
be drawn upon in working out their detailed meaning. Moreover, more detailed guidance is given 
in the Singapore statute itself. The ‘fair and equitable’ criterion specifically imports requirement 
                                               
particularly at 20: ‘Anecdotally, it has been said that, during the preparation of the proposals and the Bill, more time 
was spent by the Insolvency Service and those whom they consulted considering the vexed question of how 
administrations would be funded than any other single topic.  The assumption is that the topic proved too difficult 
because neither the White Paper nor the Bill made any provision for funding administrations.’ 
109  The Insolvency Service, Encouraging Company Rescue (n 46). 
110  See the Insolvency Service, A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework: A Consultation on Options 
for Reform (n 4). 
111  See the Insolvency Service, A Summary of Responses: A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework (n 
45), [5.52]: ‘[Some] respondents were concerned that any changes made to the order of priority would have a 
negative impact on the lending environment by increasing the cost of borrowing.’ 
112  See World Bank, ‘Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunities for All’ (The World Bank, 25 October 2016) 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB17-Full-
Report.pdf>, at 159: ‘Whether post-commencement finance receives priority over ordinary unsecured creditors 
during distribution of assets. A score of 1 is assigned if yes; 0.5 if post-commencement finance is granted 
superpriority over all creditors, secured and unsecured; 0 if no priority is granted to post-commencement finance or 
if the law contains no provisions on this subject.’ 
113  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211H(3).  
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that a dissenting creditor must receive at least as much under a scheme as it would receive were 
the scheme not approved.114 Moreover, a dissenting secured creditor must receive the value of its 
security and a dissenting unsecured creditor should be paid in full before shareholders receive 
anything. This is the so–called ‘absolute priority’ rule.115 
The main justification for the introduction of cross-class creditor cram-down in Singapore 
comes in the 2013 Report.116 According to the ILRC, if dissenting creditors get the same or more 
under a restructuring plan as they would in a liquidation and are not the subject of discrimination, 
then any complaint that the scheme is being unreasonably imposed upon them sounds hollow. As 
the ILRC pointed out, the objections may come from creditors seeking to improve their bargaining 
position and to get a greater stake in the restructured business. A cross-class creditor mechanism 
would also reduce the amount of time spent in disputes about creditor classification since it ceases 
being the most decisive issue to resolve. At the same time, a minority in the ILRC were against 
the introduction of cram-down provisions since they rely ‘on comparative valuations between 
rescue and liquidation, which are often speculative or in some cases nuanced to make rescue sound 
more attractive.’117 The ILRC therefore recommended ‘a high threshold of proof’ allowing the 
court to check against unreasonable valuations and abuse of the cram-down provisions.118 It also 
suggested that the court should have the option of appointing an assessor or expert to provide 
assistance in valuation matters. 
Valuation disputes are undoubtedly difficult and in some cases almost requiring an economic 
crystal ball to predict future conditions. The Singapore law has taken on board the suggestion that 
a valuation expert may be appointed to assist the court.119 The 2017 reforms however, tweaked the 
ILRC’s recommendation (and Chapter 11) by making the relevant comparator the creditors’ 
position if the scheme did not come to pass rather than if the company were liquidated.120 There 
was a suggestion that the 75 per cent in value requirement was unnecessary and overly restrictive 
but the Ministry referred back to the consideration of the relevant arguments by the ILRC.121 
Recent reform proposals advanced by both the European Commission and the Insolvency 
Service in the UK also contain provisions for cross-class cram-down that are dependent on ‘value’ 
determinations being made by relevant courts or administrative authorities. Working out value, 
whether on a liquidation or restructured enterprise basis, is no easy task and the appointment of 
property qualified valuation experts will not necessarily solve all the matters since each party may 
come to the court armed with their own ‘independent’ expert. It may also be the case that the 
restructuring takes place in a period of depressed asset values either in the particular sector where 
the company operates, or in the economy more generally. It is easier to put a value on a company 
                                               
114  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211H(4)(a). 
115  For a suggestion that the US ‘absolute priority’ principle is less absolute than it might superficially appear 
see MJ Roe and F Tung, ‘Breaking bankruptcy priority: How rent-seeking upends the creditors’ bargain’ (2013) 99 
Virginia Law Review 1235 and see also S Lubben, ‘The Overstated Absolute Priority Rule’ (2016) 21 Fordham 
Journal of Financial and Corporate Law 581. 
116  See the discussion at 2013 Report (n 10) 154 – 157. 
117  ibid 155. 
118  ibid 156. 
119  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211H(5). 
120  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211H(4). 
121  See Ministry of Law, ‘Ministry’s Response to Feedback from Public Consultation on the Draft Companies 
(Amendment) Bill 2017 to Strengthen Singapore as an International Centre for Debt Restructuring’ (Ministry of 
Law, 27 February 2017) <https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/content/dam/minlaw/corp/News/Annex%20A%20-
%20Goverment%20Response%20to%20Public%20Consult%20Feedback%20for%20Companies%20Act%20Amen
dments.pdf>, at 18 – 19. 
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if there are competing bids from rival bidders or some sort of formal auction or bidding process 
but the depressed economic conditions may deter or rule out rival bids. Valuation experts, however 
eminent or distinguished their qualifications, are not able to forecast future economic with perfect 
precision. 
The possibility of a contested valuation hearing gives however, junior creditors a certain 
amount of leverage. They can obstruct the restructuring for a certain period of time until the 
necessary hearing is held and the outcome of the hearing is also contingent. The valuation hearing 
incentivises all the relevant parties to try to reach a negotiated settlement since all parties have 
good reason to be fearful of both the litigation risk and also the expense that comes with valuation 
conflicts being adjudicated upon in a courtroom setting.122    
Valuation fights, it seems, are common in a US Chapter 11 context with contesting parties 
equipped with their own valuation expert prepared to advance a plausible view on the value of 
both the existing and restructured enterprise using certain standard valuation methodologies such 
as comparable transaction, discounted cash flow (DCF) and leveraged buyout pricing. The 
disadvantages in the US approach have been highlighted as follows:123 
 
First, out-of-the money creditors may fear the valuation fight less than senior creditors 
(having less to lose) and thus capture returns which they ought properly not to be entitled 
to. Secondly, negotiations can become very protracted, costing significant amounts and 
delaying rehabilitation of the company. Finally, the approach is very subjective so that the 
result is somewhat unpredictable, and the judge hearing the valuation dispute may … ‘feel 
gamed’. 
 
The 2014 report from the American Bankruptcy Institute on Chapter 11 reform suggested giving 
‘out of the money’ stakeholders ‘redemption option value’ through making changes to the 
‘absolute priority’ principle.124 It stated ‘valuation may occur during a trough in the debtor’s 
business cycle or the economy as a whole, and relying on a valuation at such a time my result in a 
reallocation of the reorganized firm’s future value in favour of senior stakeholders and away from 
junior stakeholders in a manner that is subjectively unfair and inconsistent with the Bankruptcy 
Code’s principle of providing a breathing spell from business adversity’. 
The Chapter 11 reform proposals however would increase the complexity of the 
restructuring process and given US congressional stalemate there seems little prospect of such 
changes being enacted and implemented in the immediate future.125 The detailed rules would entail 
giving a class of creditors that received nothing under a restructuring plan but was next in line to 
receive such a distribution a ‘redemption option value’ that accords with the value of an option to 
purchase the entire company and to pay in full or ‘redeem’ all the outstanding senior debt. The 
valuation of the option is done using a market based model and options pricing methodology. It 
reflects the fact that within three years the value of a restructured company might be such that 
                                               
122  See generally S Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 
37 OJLS 697; and S Paterson, ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market Norms, Legal Rights and Regulatory 
Standards’ (2014) 14 JCLS 333. 
123  See the Insolvency Service, A Summary of Responses: A Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework (n 
45) 539 for a response by S Paterson. 
124  See American Bankruptcy Institute, Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: Final Report and 
Recommendations (n 52) 207–11. 
125  For a discussion see generally D Bernstein and J Millstein, ‘ABI Commission Report: Redemption Option 
Value Explained’ (2015) 34 American Bankruptcy Institute Journal 10. 
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senior creditors can be paid in full and along with incremental value for the immediately junior 
class of stakeholders.  
There are considerable complexities associated with options pricing methodology and given 
that the Singapore reforms have yet to tried and tested, it seems sensible to shy away from such 
complexities especially given the fact that the US has not yet embraced them.126 
 
D. Prepackaged Schemes of Arrangement 
 
Following on from the 2016 Report, the 2017 reforms contains a mechanism for ‘prepackaged 
schemes of arrangement’.127 The provisions tend to follow those in the US under Chapter 11 rather 
than the prepackaged administration that is common in the UK. The Chapter 11 process is 
essentially a procedure whereby the broad parameters of a restructuring plan are worked out 
between relevant stakeholders in advance of the chapter 11 filing and then the company enters 
Chapter 11 with a view to overcoming holdouts among minority creditors. The fact that the main 
contours of the plan have been worked out in advance of the filing reduces the leverage of minority 
groups and also reduces the amount of time spent in Chapter 11. The fact that the plan has 
nevertheless to be approved by a court provides some measure of protection for minority creditors. 
The UK pre-packaged administration, on the other hand, has less procedural protection in that 
the procedure may not necessarily come before any court for approval. Essentially, it is an 
expedited procedure that may lead to a going-concern sale of all, or part, of an ailing company’s 
assets.128 Before the administration process is activated, the company works out an agreement with 
its secured lenders under which certain corporate assets will be transferred to a new business 
vehicle with the existing security interests remaining in place and the secured lenders continuing 
their financial support for the business. A likely buyer for the assets is identified and this may be 
newly constituted entity that is connected to the existing management team. An insolvency 
practitioner (IP) may help the company to put together the various deals and the IP may then be 
appointed as administrator to the company under the out-of-court process. The IP then implements 
the sale of assets and the other arrangements consequent on the sale. 
There have been complaints however, that prepackaged administrations may involve 
‘sweetheart’ deals for existing management at the expense of unsecured creditors.129 Secured 
creditors are protected because their security remains in place but unsecured creditors are left with 
claims against an ‘oldco’ that has been shorn of assets. It is important to ensure that the price paid 
for the assets is a fair one and that the assets have been properly marketed especially if the 
prospective buyer has links to the existing management. There have been statements of insolvency 
practice formulated by the relevant regulatory bodies to try to maintain fairness and integrity in 
                                               
126  See generally S Paterson, ‘Rethinking Corporate Bankruptcy Theory in the Twenty-First Century’ (2016) 
37 OJLS 697, in particular 718 – 720; ‘Bargaining in Financial Restructuring: Market Norms, Legal Rights and 
Regulatory Standards’ (2014) 14 JCLS 333. 
127  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211I. 
128  For an extended discussion including comparative analysis see P Walton and M Wellard ‘A Comparative 
Analysis of Anglo-Australian Pre-Packs: Can the Means be Made to Justify the Ends?’ (2012) 21 International 
Insolvency Review 143.  
129  See generally The Insolvency Service, Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration: Report to The Rt 
Hon Vince Cable MP (16 June 2014). 
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the process and the UK government has taken a reserve power to legislate by statutory instrument 
in the event of serious shortcomings.130   
Prepacks combine some of the advantages of informal out of court workouts with those of 
formal insolvency procedures. They build on the insight that there is likely to be a substantial 
saving of cost and convenience if a debtor can minimise the period of time that it spends in formal 
procedures. The longer and more drawn out the procedure, the greater the costs and expenses that 
are likely to be incurred. It is also the case that a debtor may suffer a loss of goodwill and valuable 
customers once formal procedures are commenced. 
Prepacks even in the US however, lack some of the procedural protections associated with 
more traditional Chapter 11 procedures. There have been suggestions that prepacks are more a 
quick fix rather than a cure for underlying ills in the business model. Also some US empirical 
studies argue that companies with pre-packaged Chapter 11s are more likely ‘forum shop’ - file 
for relief in an advantageous location rather than the centre of the company’s operations, and also 
that such companies may make a ‘Chapter 22’ filing within a few years i.e. once again seek 
protection from its creditors.131 Be that as it may, there have been market developments in the US 
which combine ‘prepacks’ with ‘going concern sales’. Under section 363 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code, the courts can authorise going concern sales of the assets or operations of a company in 
Chapter 11 but they have required a substantial business justification for the sale.132 Perhaps, the 
most notable example where this occurred is in relation to the General Motors (GM) car 
company.133 
GM, a huge auto manufacturer and distributor, was effectively reorganised through a sale 
of potentially the profitable part of the company’s businesses to a newly created shell company 
with the shell company paying a certain amount for the assets of the ‘old’ General Motors and also 
agreeing to assume certain workforce-related liabilities. The detailed structure and funding 
arrangement in respect of the shell company had been negotiated in advance of the Chapter 11 
filing and the US government acted as the main finance provider. Certain creditors objected to the 
process arguing that the so-called ‘business sale’ constituted in reality a restructuring and also 
upset the normal priorities scheme since the new car company – new GM – had assumed certain 
liabilities of the old GM but refused to assume other liabilities that were higher up the priority 
ranking. The Bankruptcy Court however, rejected this argument stating that section 363 authorised 
                                               
130  See section 129 of Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 (UK) (inserting a new provision 
in Schedule B1 para 60 Insolvency Act 1986) which allows regulations to be made that prohibit or impose 
requirements or conditions in relation to the disposal, hiring out or sale of property of a company by an 
administrator to a connected person of the company. No such regulations have been made yet. 
131  L LoPucki and S Kalin, ‘The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: 
Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom”’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 231. But for different 
perspectives see R Rasmussen and R Thomas, ‘Timing Matters: Promoting Forum-shopping by Insolvent 
Corporations’ (2000) 94 Northwestern University Law Review 135 arguing that the Bankruptcy Code (US) would 
be more efficient if the law facilitated more forum shopping for bankruptcy venues; D Skeel, ‘What’s So Bad about 
Delaware?’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 309; H Miller, ‘Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware 
Myth’ (2002) 55 Vanderbilt Law Review 1987; T Zywicki, ‘Is Forum-Shopping Corrupting America’s Bankruptcy 
Courts?’ (2006) 94 Georgetown Law Journal 1141. 
132  On the ‘business justification’ test for Bankruptcy Code (US), s 363 sales, see In re Lionel Corp (1983) 722 
F2d 1063. 
133  The restructuring of another major US auto manufacturer – Chrysler – was a prelude to that in General 
Motors and on the Chrysler and General Motors restructurings see the US Congressional Oversight Panel report on 
the same: US Congressional Oversight Panel, The Use of TARP Funds in the Support and Reorganization of the 
Domestic Automotive Industry (9 September 2009). This report contains a perceptive analysis of US restructuring 
and bankruptcy law and attached papers that are both supportive and critical of the GM/Chrysler de facto rescues. 
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the sale of corporate assets outside the normal course of business in the event of there being a 
business justification for the sale.134 In this case, an expeditious sale was considered to be justified 
because business and customers would melt away if there were continued uncertainty about the 
fate of GM cars.135 
Despite the concerns about bypassing standard Chapter 11 protections, the US prepack clearly 
offers more procedural safeguards than its UK counterpart in that it has to come before the court 
for approval. Not surprisingly the 2016 Report suggested a Pre-Pack regime that was essentially 
similar to the US regime.136 The 2017 reforms allow the court to approve a scheme if it is satisfied 
that had a meeting of creditors of classes of creditors been held, the necessary consents would have 
been obtained.137 The 2017 reforms also require that in a prepack there should be adequate advance 
disclosure to creditors and sets out a clear standard for this disclosure.138 Nevertheless, the 
experience in other jurisdictions suggests the need for caution in exercising these new powers to 
approve prepacks.  
 
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE CHALLENGES OF TRANSPLANTING US CHAPTER 11 
TO SINGAPORE 
 
UK academics and English bank lenders have cautioned against the transplantation of the Chapter 
11 model into the UK and, in particular, the moratorium and debtor in possession model which 
allows the grant of priority and super-priority in rescue financing.139 Similar concerns were raised 
by the ILRC in the context of Singapore,140 whose regime has, largely been pro-creditor and in 
particular, pro-secured creditor.141 It remains an empirical issue whether the cost of credit for 
companies will be driven up by the new 2017 reforms. The success of the reforms also hinges on 
whether the judges hearing the cases will develop the requisite expertise to manage these cases 
effectively.142 In this section, we offer some reflections on the transplant of Chapter 11 in terms of 
regulatory philosophies.  
 
A. Relationship Between Restructuring and Corporate Governance 
 
1. Shareholder veto 
 
                                               
134  In re General Motors Corp (2009) 407 BR 463. 
135  For different perspectives see D Baird, ‘Lessons From The Automobile Reorganizations’ (2012) 4 Journal 
of Legal Analysis 271; S Lubben, ‘No Big Deal: The GM and Chrysler Cases in Context’ (2009) 82 American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal 531; M Roe and D Skeel, ‘Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy’ (2010) 108 Michigan Law 
Review 727. 
136  2016 Report (n 11) 27. 
137  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211I. 
138 Companies Act (Singapore), section 211I(3). 
139  Eg J Payne, Lessons from the United States (n 17); The Insolvency Service, A Summary of Responses: A 
Review of the Corporate Insolvency Framework (n 45) 67 – response by British Bankers Association. 
140  2013 Report, 156. 
141  Prior to the 2017 reforms, the secured creditor had a strong ability to veto a judicial management order. See 
n. 64 and accompanying text above.  
142  The 2016 Report calls for the restructuring proceedings to be heard by a bench of specialist judges. See 
2016 Report (n 11) 15 – 16.  
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It has been argued above that a Chapter 11 regime, the possibility of a contested valuation hearing 
may shift some of the power of negotiation to subordinated creditors, who otherwise in a pro-
creditor regime, have very little say when they are ‘out of the money’.143 One of the major 
criticisms of the Chapter 11 proceedings in the US is that despite the absolute priority rule, 
subordinated creditors and shareholders are given disproportionate voice in the restructuring 
process as a result of these junior interests taking advantage of the uncertainty of the valuation.144 
However, scholars have pointed out that the problem may be more apparent than real for the larger 
restructurings in practice. The study by LoPucki and Whitford145 of large publicly held companies 
involved in Chapter 11 proceedings between 1979 to 1988 demonstrates that in practice, 
shareholders do receive payoffs though the payoffs though the payoffs are not as significant as 
anticipated. Other scholars have argued that the more recent practices in relation to DIP financing 
effectively mean that DIP financers have a lot more leverage over restructurings,146 thereby 
neutralising the threat that debtor companies may hold the creditors hostage as part of the process. 
Professor Baird has commented: ‘By the early 2000s, equity commonly received nothing in the 
vast majority of cases.’147 
In Singapore, by way of contrast to Chapter 11 which contains specific provisions on 
shareholder cram-down,148 the 2017 reforms do not subject shareholders to a cram-down.149 The 
Ministry of Law considered this issue but took the view that shareholder approval is not uncommon 
in the debt-equity share swaps and wished to preserve the existing position. 150 Thus, depending 
on the place of incorporation of the debtor and/or any applicable listing rules if the debtor is listed, 
shareholder approval may still be required. In particular, if the debtor is incorporated and/or listed 
in Singapore, in certain kinds of restructuring, particularly those involving debt-equity swap or 
major sales of the assets in pre-packs,151 shareholder approval will be required. It appears 
paradoxical that junior creditors are subject to cram-down but shareholders may have an effective 
right of veto over the restructuring. In response to the suggestion of hold-ups, the Ministry of Law 
took the view that there is very little risk of this under the 2017 reforms because of the absolute 
priority rule found in section 211H(4)(ii), which requires the unsecured creditors to be paid in full 
                                               
143  See n 123 (and accompanying text).  
144  ibid. See also DG Baird & D Bernstein, ‘Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization 
Bargain’ (2006) Yale LJ 1930.  
145  LM LoPucki and WC Whitford, ‘Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganisation of Large, 
Publicly Held Companies’ (1993) 141 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 669.  
146  D Skeel, ‘Creditors' Ball: The New Corporate Governance in Chapter 11’ (2003) 152 U Pa L Rev 
917, 952. 
147  D Baird, ‘Chapter 11's Expanding Universe’ (2015) 87 Temple Law Review 975 at 979 and see also K 
Ayotte and E Morrison, ‘Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11’ (2009) 1 Journal of Legal Analysis 511 
(finding pervasive creditor control in large privately and publicly held businesses that filed Chapter 11 in 2001).  
148  Bankruptcy Code (US), sections 1126(d) and 1129(2)(C). 
149  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211H (2) refers to cram-down on classes of creditors only. 
150  Ministry of Law, Response to Feedback from Public Consultation (n 121) 19 – 20. 
151  Eg Companies Act (Singapore), section 160 (sale of substantially all of the assets of the company) requires 
shareholder approvals. Further, for Singapore Exchange-listed companies (whether incorporated in Singapore 
elsewhere), under the listing rules, a substantial disposal of the assets of the company requires shareholder approvals 
(chapter 10). Depending on the number of shares that may be issued in connection with the debt-equity swap, the 
recipient of the shares may require a ‘white-wash’ waiver, that is the approval of the independent shareholders, 
under the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers to avoid having to make a mandatory offer for the remaining 
shares. 
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before the subordinated creditors or shareholders receive any ‘property on account of the 
subordinated claim or the [shareholder’s] interest’.152  
However, in our view, the absolute priority rule, as framed in section 211H, will not 
completely eliminate the risk of hold-ups by shareholders with a view to extracting payoffs that 
are given to them in a different capacity and, in particular, as part of the management team. 
Shareholders have nothing to lose by delay and may insist on some payoff to management even if 
junior creditors were to receive either nothing or a small amount considerably less than their full 
claims. Junior creditors will face the choice of either consenting to the shareholders’ insistence of 
payoffs (even though the shareholders are ‘out of the money’) or face the alternative of a cram-
down, which may be more disadvantageous to them financially. The absolute priority rule, as 
framed in section 211H, will arguably not apply to prevent the cram-down of the junior creditors 
if the payoff is to the existing management team; thus, the risk of prejudice to the subordinated 
creditors is high if the management team is either made up of large shareholders or controlled by 
such shareholders. On the other hand,153 the court has an overriding discretion not to approve the 
scheme on the ground that it is not fair and equitable.154  
The 2017 reforms may have inadvertently created a situation where the shareholders are 
able to exert leverage over junior creditors in the case of larger-scale insolvencies involving listed 
companies in Singapore and indeed in much of Asia. The reforms are designed to enhance the 
attractiveness of Singapore as a restructuring hub for international companies including, in 
particular, Asian companies, but, unlike the US and UK, Asian stock markets are dominated by 
companies with concentrated shareholdings, whether in the hands of the state or families.155 In 
larger scale restructurings typically involving listed companies, the concern that a 
debtor/management-friendly regime can lead to abuse is very real.156 The management and the 
controlling shareholders (whether it is the state or families) have incentives to put forward an 
agenda that favours their continued control of the company.157 In a pro-creditor regime, these 
                                               
152  See n 150 above. See also Minister of State for Law’s speech in Parliament: “Shareholders' cram down 
exists in Chapter 11, but Chapter 11 is an insolvency process that re-organises both debt and equity of a company. 
By contrast, the new provisions support creditor schemes, which only bind the company’s creditors. The current 
cram down provisions ensure that the scheme distributes a company’s property to its creditors in a fair and equitable 
manner and are not concerned with adjustments to shareholder interests [emphasis the authors’].” Singapore 
Parliamentary Debates, vol 94, session 1, 10 March 2017.  
153  For example, in the restructuring of Crest Nicholson plc (completed in 2009), there were the senior debt 
holder, second lien debtholders and mezzanine debt. The original senior debt was reduced in exchange for the senior 
debt and second lien debtholders holding 90 per cent equity in a new company (newco) but mezzanine lenders were 
not offered any equity in the newco; the balance of 10 per cent was held by management.  See J Bannister & E 
Mathison, ‘New Tricks for an Old Dog: the Recent Use of Schemes of Arrangement for Restructurings in the UK’ 
(2009) Business Restructuring and Insolvency Quarterly 26. 
154  Companies Act (Singapore), section 211H(3).  
155  For Singapore, see C Chen, WY Wan and W Zhang, ‘Board Independence as a Panacea to Tunneling? An 
Empirical Study of Related Party Transactions in Hong Kong and Singapore’ (2017) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2991423> (based on a sample of 103 Singapore-listed 
companies, the data shows approximately 66 per cent of the Singapore companies have beneficial owners over 30 
per cent and 87 per cent). For the rest of Asia, see RW Carney and TB Child, ‘Changes to the Ownership and 
Control of East Asian Corporations between 1996 and 2008 : The Primacy of Politics’ (2013) 107 Journal of 
Financial Economics 494. 
156  In the Asia Pulp and Paper restructuring, some of the creditors had opposed the management-led 
restructuring because they believed that controlling shareholders had caused the company to be in distressed in the 
first place. See Deutsche Bank v Asia Paper & Pulp [2003] 2 SLR 320. 
157  D Hahn, ‘Concentrated Ownership and Control of Corporate Reorganisations’ (n 18). 
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persons have much less leverage since the creditors are the ones determining the success of the re-
organisation.   
 
2. Duties of directors and insolvency practitioners in a cram-down scheme of arrangement 
 
A matter not addressed in the 2017 reforms, and left to case law, is the issue of the duties that are 
owed by directors and restructuring specialists (normally IPs) who are hired to oversee the cram-
down scheme of arrangement. It is trite law that directors owe fiduciary duties to the company and 
when the company is insolvent, there is a duty to act in the interests of the creditors.158 In 
Singapore, in TT International (No. 1), the Court of Appeal has further held that a proposed scheme 
manager, in a conventional scheme of arrangement under section 210, who is hired to formulate 
and implement the scheme of arrangement, owes a duty to ‘strike the right balance [emphasis the 
court’s] and manage the competing interests of successfully securing the approval of his proposed 
scheme and uncompromisingly respecting the procedural rights of all involved in the scheme 
process’.159 Such a duty exists despite the fact that the proposed scheme manager is inherently in 
a position of conflict since his remuneration depends on the success of his efforts in resuscitating 
the company.160 
Difficult questions may arise as to how the directors and the proposed scheme managers 
should properly view their respective roles when the proposed restructuring involves a company 
which is either insolvent or close to insolvency and it is proposed that certain classes of junior 
creditors should receive greater write-down (and even cram-down) of their debts than other 
classes. While the courts will generally not review the decisions of directors with hindsight under 
the business judgment doctrine,161 the protection is lost if the allegation is one of conflict of 
interest, such as where the management team is allocated equity or other participatory interest in 
the post-scheme company. Further, it is by no means clear that the proposed scheme managers 
have similar protections as the business judgment doctrine.  
 Some guidance may be drawn from the UK decisions on schemes of arrangement involving 
de facto ‘squeeze-outs’. In Re IMO Carwash, which involved a business transfer scheme, it was 
argued by certain creditors that the directors were not acting in the interests of all creditors when 
they approved the proposed scheme of arrangement which would have resulted in the senior 
creditors owning most of the ‘newco’ and the objecting creditors left in the ‘oldco’ which was a 
shell company (and facing a de facto cram-down). There were seven directors on the board that 
approved the proposed scheme; five of them would receive significant bonuses in ‘newco’ if 
certain targets were met and the remaining two were independent directors. Mann J rejected the 
argument, holding that the objecting creditors were negotiating on their own behalf and in any 
case, they no longer had any economic interest.162 Mann J placed weight on the fact that the 
independent directors had approved the scheme. Going forward, when the directors determine that 
certain classes have no economic interests and/or should be crammed-down, it is likely that 
valuation issues will play a prominent role in deciding whether the directors have acted properly 
                                               
158  Eg West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd (1988) 4 BCC 30; Liquidators of Progen Engineering Pte Ltd v Progen 
Holdings Ltd [2010] 4 SLR 1089.  
159  Royal Bank of Scotland v TT International (No. 1) [2012] 2 SLR  213. 
160  See WY Wan, ‘Recent developments in schemes of arrangement in Singapore: classification of creditors 
and scheme manager's conflicts of interest’ [2013] JBL 552. 
161  Eg Re Continental Assurance Company of London plc [2007] 2 BCLC 287. 
162  Re Bluebrook [2009] EWHC 2114 para 63.   
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in the discharge of their duties to the company and/or whether the scheme managers have paid 
proper regard to the interest of the creditors. The views of independent directors will be important, 
particularly if the directors face a conflict of interest.   
 
B. Attracting International Business - the Recognition of Singapore Schemes Around the 
World 
 
The second issue that arises is whether the transplant of Chapter 11 will work in attracting 
international restructuring and insolvency players to Singapore. New York and London are major 
international debt restructuring centres163 but it should be remembered that most international bond 
offerings are governed by either New York or English law and it remains to be seen whether 
Singapore can compete on this global scale given the fact Singapore law does not appear to be 
used widely as a basis for international bond issues. We make the following observations.  
Firstly, there is what is known as the ‘Gibbs’ point i.e. if a Singapore scheme purports to 
modify debt obligations that are governed by a foreign law, whether that purported modification 
will be recognised by the courts or authorities in the relevant foreign jurisdiction.164 There is a 
long-established principle of the common law that the discharge of a debt under foreign insolvency 
law will not be given effect in the UK where the contract creating the debt is governed by English 
law. It was said in the Gibbs case165 held that the foreign law was not relevant because it was ‘not 
a law of the country to which the contract belongs, or one by which the contracting parties can be 
taken to have agreed to be bound; it is the law of another country by which they have not agreed 
to be bound’. 
In recent years, the Gibbs principle has been approved at the highest UK judicial levels by 
Lord Hope in Joint Administrators of Heritable Bank Plc v Winding Up Board of Landsbanki 
Islands HF166 and there is also a statement by Lord Hoffmann in Wight v Eckhardt Marine 
GmbH167 that the question whether an obligation has been extinguished is governed by its proper 
law. Moreover, in Global Distressed Alpha Fund 1 Ltd Partnership v PT Bakrie,168 it was held 
that the movement towards ‘universalism’ in insolvency proceedings did not allow a lower court 
to disregard the established doctrine and therefore the discharge of a debt under Indonesian 
restructuring and insolvency law would not be given effect in the UK where the contract creating 
the debt was subject to English law. 
As part of the move towards universalism, the Singapore courts have been less than 
impressed by Gibbs and it was held in Re Pacific Andes Resources Development169 that upon 
recognising foreign insolvency proceedings, it may give effect to a compromise or discharge of 
                                               
163  See generally G McCormack ‘Bankruptcy Forum Shopping: The UK and US as venues of choice for 
foreign companies’ (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 815; LC Ho, ‘Making and enforcing 
international schemes of arrangement’ (2011) 26 JIBLR 434; J Payne, ‘Cross-Border Schemes of Arrangement and 
Forum Shopping’ (n 21). 
164  See Justice K Ramesh, ‘The Gibbs Principle: The Tether on the Feet of Good Forum Shopping’ (2017) 29 
SAcLJ 42. 
165  Gibbs v La Société Industrielle et Commerciale des Métaux (1890) 25 QBD 399 CA.  
166  Joint Administrators of Heritable Bank Plc v Winding up Board of Landsbanki Islands HF [2013] UKSC 
13; [2013] 1 WLR 725 at [44]. 
167  Wight v Eckhardt Marine GmbH [2003] UKPC 37; [2004] 1 AC 147 at [11]. 
168  Global Distressed Alpha Fund 1 Ltd Partnership v PT Bakrie [2011] EWHC 256 (Comm); [2011] 1 WLR 
2038. 
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debts governed by Singapore law that was purportedly effected by a foreign insolvency or 
restructuring law. Nevertheless, Gibbs remains the law in the UK and given the Rome 1 
Regulation170 there may also be difficulties in obtaining recognition in other European countries 
of a Singapore scheme that purports to modify foreign law obligations.171 Under generally 
accepted principles of private international law, the modification or termination of a contract is 
governed by the proper law of the contract.172 This principle is reflected in the Rome I Regulation 
which provides in Article 12(1) that the law applicable to a contract shall govern in particular: (a) 
interpretation; (b) performance; (c) the consequences of a total or partial breach of obligations and 
‘(d) the various ways of extinguishing obligations, and prescription and limitation of actions’.173 
Secondly, the difficulties in getting recognition of a Singapore scheme overseas may be 
compounded in cases where Singapore is not the centre of main interests (Comi) of the debtor. The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency174 which Singapore has now adopted and 
which has been adopted by other major trading nations including the US facilitates the recognition 
of cross-border insolvency proceedings and specifically in the cases of both Singapore and the US, 
proceedings for the rearrangement of debt. The greatest recognition and relief however, comes in 
cases where relevant proceedings have been opened in States where the debtor has its Comi. In 
other situations, the relief that may be granted by the courts of the recognising State is purely 
discretionary.175 
Finally, in many insolvency and restructuring situations, there are strong political interests at 
stake and these may militate against the recognition of foreign proceedings in respect of a debtor 
that is a local or national champion. Commentators for instance, have spoken of the influence of 
provincial governments in China and the factor of local protectionism.176 Under the US law, 
Chapter 11 restructuring proceedings may be opened in respect of a foreign debtor but such 
proceedings ultimately floundered in the well-known Yukos and Baha Mar cases because of 
hostility from foreign governmental entities. The Yukos case concerned a leading Russian oil 
company whose controlling shareholder had incurred the wrath of the Russian President and which 
was coming under financial pressure because of large and unexpected tax demands.177 The more 
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recent Baha Mar case concerned a showpiece resort in the Bahamas where the major investor was 
a Chinese state owned enterprise that was opposed to the idea of becoming subject to the long arm 
of US jurisdiction.178 Singapore itself has experienced a similar phenomenon in the Asia Pulp & 
Paper case where the Singapore courts declined to make a judicial management order in respect of 
the Singapore registered holding company of an Indonesian conglomerate.179 The operating 
companies were outside Singapore, principally in Indonesia, and declined to cooperate with the 
Singapore proceedings thereby rendering such proceedings largely futile. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
The 2017 reforms have the express objective of enhancing Singapore as an attractive destination 
to conduct corporate restructuring. It builds on the established strengths of the Singapore legal 
system and its role as a leading centre for international arbitration and mediation.180 A number of 
observations appear to be appropriate. First, our article suggests that while transplant of the US 
Chapter 11 provisions into the Singapore’s scheme of arrangement procedure (‘law in the books’) 
has taken place within a very short period of time (being less than one year from the publication 
of the 2016 Report to enactment of the reforms, the challenges will lie in how these provisions will 
be implemented in practice (‘law in action’). The scheme of arrangement has proven to be a very 
flexible tool, though not without its flaws, and the addition of innovative features from Chapter 11 
has been carefully considered with reference to Singapore conditions. For example, the 
moratorium provisions have been carefully crafted to cover related corporations and to avoid the 
problems of delay that are sometimes associated with Chapter 11. Many of the reservations 
however, that are raised in the UK relating to rescue financing could potentially continue to apply 
in the Singapore context. Moreover, the new cram-down provisions could see many disputes in 
respect of valuation including evaluating whether the directors and scheme managers have 
properly discharged their duties. Chapter 11 is itself very complex and when its provisions are 
juxtaposed into the existing scheme of arrangement procedure which has been shaped by judicial 
authority in Singapore (as in the UK), there remains much that is hazy and uncertain. This is not 
to say that the merits of such reforms are thereby diminished: indeed, the very complexity of 
restructuring transactions highlights the importance of far-sighted initiatives and the advantages 
of such initiatives will be fully seen only in the course of time as they are refined and developed. 	 Second, while the 2017 reforms seek to take the desirable features of Chapter 11 and avoid 
its disadvantageous elements, ultimately, there is fundamental shift in power from the existing 
creditors to the debtor company. In Singapore (and many other Asian countries) where the majority 
of the companies have concentrated shareholdings (including publicly listed companies),181 and 
managers are often not independent of the controllers, the question is whether the managers and/or 
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controlling shareholders in a debtor in possession model will abuse their leverage and act in ways 
that are contrary to the creditors’ interests. In particular, the absence of an express shareholder 
cram-down in the 2017 reforms may unwittingly give shareholders and/or management leverage 
at the expense of the junior creditors even when shareholders are clearly ‘out of the money’ on any 
valuation of the company’s worth.  
Finally, it remains to be seen whether the Singapore schemes will be recognised overseas. 
This is especially the case where a scheme is approved in relation to a foreign company or purports 
to modify debt obligations that are governed by a non-Singapore law. Political factors are complex 
and may militate the recognition of Singapore proceedings when the interests of a foreign state or 
government linked entity are involved, irrespective of how well fashioned Singapore’s 
restructuring and insolvency laws may be. 
